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Abstract
This study is focused on the evaluation of successes and fail-
ures of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur). This
analysis of Mercosur’s integration seeks to identify the
reasons why the bloc has stagnated in an incomplete cus-
toms union condition, although it was originally created to
achieve a common market status. To understand the evolu-
tion of Mercosur, the study offers some thoughts about the
role of the European Union (EU) as a model for regional
integration. Although an EU-style integration has served as
a model, it does not necessarily set the standards by which
integration can be measured as we analyse other integration
efforts. However, the case of Mercosur is emblematic: dur-
ing its initial years, Mercosur specifically received EU techni-
cal assistance to promote integration according to EU-style
integration. Its main original goal was to become a common
market, but so far, almost thirty years after its creation, it
remains an imperfect customs union.
The article demonstrates the extent to which almost thirty
years of integration in South America could be considered a
failure, which would be one more in a list of previous
attempts of integration in Latin America, since the 1960s.
Whether it is a failure or not, it is impossible to envisage EU-
style economic and political integration in South America in
the foreseeable future. So far, member states, including Bra-
zil, which could supposedly become the engine of economic
and political integration in South America, have remained
sceptical about the possibility of integrating further political-
ly and economically. As member states suffer political and
economic turmoil, they have concentrated on domestic
recovery before being able to dedicate sufficient time and
energy to being at the forefront of integration.
Keywords: Mercosur, European Union, regionalism, integra-
tion, international organisation
1 Introduction
Rapid changes have intervened during the last few deca-
des in the structure and development of international
organisations. Old ideas of ensuring human freedom,
dignity and welfare are still the core foundations of
international organisations and of improving the rela-
tionship of one country with another. The idea of uni-
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versality is seen as the source of the solidification and
enforcement of these values. However, the concept of
universality has also been linked to the idea of regional-
ism, both regarded as being complementary concepts
geared towards the improvement of international organ-
isations as well as to society itself.
Another significant development that is seen from the
international community is the emergence and attention
of supranational organisations as well as the importance
they hold towards their respective organisations or state.
Although there are times wherein national dependencies
matter, the role of supranational organisations, in cer-
tain cases, may go beyond that of the state itself. This
can be seen from the influence and level of authoritative
power as well as the autonomy that they enjoy, from
intra- and interregional organisations. Besides, within
the context of regionalism, member nations or involved
parties are geared towards developing intergovernmen-
tal organisations that can operate and manage the
regional cooperation, treaties, agreements and the num-
ber of accords being entered into by involved parties.
The existence of these intra- and interregional organisa-
tions is vital since it is within their activities or goals
that the fulfilment of key objectives, the development
and the success of regional integration, lies.
Before the actual establishment of Mercosur in the
1990s, there had been several attempts at achieving both
regional and economic integration among the Latin
American nations. The first were the Latin American
Free Trade Association (LAFTA), in 1960, the Latin
American Common Market (LACM), in 1965, and the
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), in
1980. All of these were categorised as failures for various
substantial reasons and for failing to achieve consensus.
However, in 1991, the Treaty of Asunción (TA) finally
paved the way for the establishment of Mercosur, which
then represented the Southern Cone Common Market.
The initial members of the subregional common market
were Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Their
cooperation has been marked as historic because these
countries had been involved in regional wars during the
20th century. More than twenty years later, in July
2012, Venezuela became a full member state; however,
on 1 December 2016, it was suspended from Mercosur
as it failed to respect human rights and to meet a four-
year deadline to fully adapt to the trade bloc regulations
required for membership. Bolivia is moving closer to
becoming the newest full member, according to the
Adhesion Protocol signed on 15 July 2015, which can be
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considered as a new step towards the enlargement of
Mercosur.1 Ecuador is expected to be next in line.
It remains to be seen whether such an enlargement can
help promote regional integration. So far, member
states, especially Brazil, have clearly preferred enlarge-
ment vis-à-vis the deepening of integration. This article
will next present some historical and institutional
aspects concerning the creation of Mercosur and how
the EU served as a model for integration.
2 Mercosur’s History of
Integration
Less than a decade after the first efforts towards integra-
tion in Europe began, during the 1950s, Latin American
countries decided to follow a similar path, being stimu-
lated by insightful information coming from the Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America and the Carib-
bean (ECLAC). The creation of the Latin American
Free Trade Association (LAFTA),2 through the signing
of the Treaty of Montevideo I in 1960, marked a crucial
moment in the history of integration in Latin America.
Twenty years later, in 1980, with the signing of the
Treaty of Montevideo II, the Latin American Associa-
tion for Integration (LAIA) was established to replace
LAFTA. The Treaty of Montevideo I that created
LAFTA was originally signed by Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. Colombia
and Ecuador joined the group in 1961, Venezuela in
1966 and Bolivia in 1967.
The ultimate and ambitious goal had been, according to
the Treaty, to move towards the ‘establishment of a Lat-
in-American common market,3 in a gradual and pro-
gressive way’.
As a first step, the Treaty established a free trade zone,
setting a deadline of twelve years within which to imple-
ment a programme for trade liberalisation, envisaging
the dismantling of tariff barriers. Article 3 of the Treaty
also defined some directives in its implementation, such
as pluralism, convergence and reciprocity. Referring to
pluralism, the Treaty underlined that the will of mem-
ber countries should sustain the need to integrate over
and above the diversity, which might exist in political
and economic matters in the region. Convergence, that
is, progressive multilateralization of partial scope agree-
ments, can be achieved by means of periodical negotia-
tions between member countries. Regarding reciprocity,
1. The protocol of admission defines the different stages and commitment
to reach the full incorporation of Bolivia into Mercosur. The admission
as a full member will take place once the Legislatives of the other mem-
ber states of Mercosur ratify the protocol. So far, Uruguay (17 May
2017) and Paraguay (13 August 2018) have deposited their instrument
of ratification.
2. Others efforts of integration processes started during the 1960s and
1970s: the Central American Common Market (CACM) in 1960, the
Andean Pact (later CAN) in 1969 and the Caribbean Community (CARI-
COM) in 1973.
3. Source: http://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/LAIA-ALA DI.
pdf.
member countries should expand their imports to the
same extent that their exports increase.
Although LAFTA, in its initial years, stimulated trade
among member countries, these principles had been
overlooked. At the end of the 1960s, LAFTA became
obsolete since member countries had not complied with
several principles, including those previously men-
tioned. Items eligible on the common lists for preferen-
tial treatment had never been fully liberalised; access to
markets had been unequally distributed; institutions to
monitor and enforce reciprocity had not been created;
most of the bilateral agreements were restricted to the
Big Three (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico). The other
two groups that were led by Chile, Colombia and Vene-
zuela (the middle group), and Bolivia, Ecuador and Par-
aguay (the least-developed economies), had started to
complain about the agreement because the benefits of
integration mostly favoured the Big Three.4 Disap-
pointment with such a scenario had expedited the for-
mation of the foundation of the Andean Group within
LAFTA in 1969.5
In addition, the role of ECLAC, which had initially gui-
ded the process of integration, had consisted of prevent-
ing any possibility of success. Guidelines from ECLAC
to the Third World had consisted of the adoption of
strategies of import substitution industrialisation (ISI)
and protectionist policies.6 The intention had been to
create and strengthen an internal market that would lead
to development and self-sufficiency. However, several
courses of action had been undertaken at the time,
which were felt to be essential in order to achieve this
goal. Instead, they created a negative impact in the inte-
gration process. These undertakings included nationali-
sation, subsidisation of industries, augmented taxation
and highly protectionist trade policies.
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico had adopted the strategy
of ISI, a policy that was obviously dissimilar to the pro-
cess of integration that LAFTA proposed. Referring to
the Brazilian perception of the integration process at the
time, Vaz affirmed that:
the Brazilian resistance to the creation of a common
market was demonstrated since the late 1950s and it
remained throughout the trajectory of LAFTA … it
reflected … the option for autonomy in promoting
4. D.D. Paiva & M.B. Braga, ‘Integração econômica regional e desenvolvi-
mento econômico: reflexões sobre a experiência latino-americana’,
9(16) Revista de Desenvolvimento Econômico 61-71 (2007).
5. The Andean Group (predecessor of the Andean Community) was cre-
ated with the signature of its founding treaty, the Cartagena Agree-
ment, by five countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru.
Venezuela joined the group in 1973, while Chile left it in 1976. Another
important subregional experience created during the 1960s was the
Central American Common Market (CACM). The Treaty of Managua
was signed in 1960 by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicara-
gua, while Costa Rica joined the bloc in 1963. In: R.J. Langhammer &
U. Hiemenz, ‘The Rationale of Regional Integration Among Developing
Countries’, 1 International Economic Integration, Critical Perspectives
on the World Economy (1998).
6. W. Baer, ‘Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America:
Experiences and Interpretations’, 7(1) Latin American Research Review
95-122 (1972 Spring).
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economic development, guided then by the import
substitution model.7
Finally, several countries in Latin America had military
governments, whose outlook had been predominantly
against making concessions that affected national sover-
eignty.
LAIA tried to learn from the mistakes made by its pred-
ecessor. Although Article 1 of the Treaty of Montevideo
II decrees that ‘[t]he long-term objective of such a pro-
cess shall be the gradual and progressive establishment
of a Latin American common market’, in practice this is
not an achievable goal. LAIA is more realistic and less
ambitious.8 At the same time, the Treaty underlines that
member countries may decide ‘to renew the Latin-
American integration process and to establish objectives
and mechanisms compatible with the reality of the
region’.9 In addition, LAIA defines in Article 3 the
principles that should guide the agreement,10 which
embraces the concept of a system in favour of countries
at a relatively less advanced stage of economic develop-
ment. The institutional and legal framework of LAIA
(‘umbrella’) works as a central record-keeping authority
and custodian of bilateral or subregional agreements
(including Mercosur). These subregional agreements
are composed of benefits and concessions that are
restricted to signatories, without being extended to third
countries.11 Besides, LAIA has limited integration to
sectors of production, in a fragmented way – the inten-
tion is that not only countries, but also those sectors of
production will gradually converge and unite. Three
mechanisms were defined to eventually achieve such
unity:
a. Regional Tariff Preference, in which member coun-
tries shall reciprocally grant a regional tariff prefer-
ence to be applied with reference to the level in force
for third countries and be subject to the correspond-
ing regulation;
b. Regional Scope Agreements, those in which all mem-
ber countries participate; and
c. Partial Scope Agreements, those in which two or
more countries of the area participate.
One important difference between LAFTA and LAIA
refers to the partial scope agreements.12 According to
7. A.C. Vaz, Cooperação, integração e processo negociador: a construção
do Mercosul. Instituto brasileiro de relações internacionais, Brasília
(2002), at 59.
8. A. Malamud & P. Schmitter, ‘The Experience of European Integration
and the Potential for Integration in South America’, IBEI Working Paper,
CIDOB editions, Barcelona 2007.
9. Treaty of Montevideo II. Source: http://Mercosur.sice.oas.org/trade/
Montev_tr/Montev1e.asp#chapI. Retrieved on 27June 2019.
10. http://sice.oas.org/trade/Montev_tr/Montev1e.asp#chapI. Retrieved
on 27 June 2019.
11. A. Barbiero & Y. Chaloult, ‘O Mercosul e a nova ordem econômica
internacional’, 44(1) Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 22-42
(2001).
12. Article 9 of the Treaty of Montevideo (1980) defines the rules that gov-
ern partial scope agreements: a) They shall remain open to adhesion, by
previous negotiation of the remaining country-members; b) They shall
contain clauses promoting convergence in order that their benefits
reach all member countries; c) They may contain clauses promoting
the principle of convergence (meaning progressive mul-
tilateralization of partial scope agreements by means of
periodical negotiations between member countries), it
allows member states to establish trade agreements with
third countries, both inside and outside the region. In
other words, this principle allows all member states of
LAIA to take part, if they wish to do so, in all partial
scope agreements. As defined in Chapter V Article 27:
At the same time, member countries may draw up
partial scope agreements with other developing coun-
tries or respective economic integration areas outside
Latin America, following the various modalities fore-
seen in the third section of chapter II of the present
Treaty, and under the terms of the pertinent regula-
tive provisions.
The so-called Economic Complementation Agreements
(ECAs) lie in the realm of partial scope agreements.
According to Resolution 1 Article 1, adopted by the
LAFTA Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs: ‘Con-
tracting Parties shall incorporate into the new integra-
tion scheme, the concessions granted in national lists,
non-extensive lists and complementation agreements.’
These ECAs deal with fixed tariff preference agree-
ments, free-trade agreements and subregional integra-
tion agreements. As a subregional integration agree-
ment, Mercosur was protocolised at LAIA through the
Partial Scope Economic Complementarity Agreement
(PS.ECA) number 1813 (see Annex I). In order to be
protocolised at LAIA, partial scope agreements must be
concluded according to the several procedural rules lis-
convergence with other Latin American countries, in concurrence with
the mechanisms established in the present Treaty; d) They shall include
differential treatments depending on the three categories of countries
recognized by the present Treaty. The implementation of such treat-
ments as well as negotiation procedures for their periodical revision at
the request of any member country which may consider itself at a
disadvantage shall be determined in each agreement; e) Tariff reduc-
tions may be applied to the same products or tariff sub-items and on
the basis of a percentage rebate regarding the tariffs applied to imports
originating from non-participating countries; f) They shall be in force for
a minimum term of one year; and g) They may include, among others,
specific rules regarding origin, safeguard clauses, non-tariff restrictions,
withdrawal of concessions, renegotiation of concessions, denounce-
ment, co-ordination and harmonization of policies. Should these specific
rules not have been adopted, the general provisions to be established
by member countries on the respective matters shall be taken into
account. Source: http://sice.oas.org/trade/Montev_tr/Montev1e.
asp#chapI.
13. The notification of the Treaty of Asunción was made through LAIA,
invoking the ‘enabling clause’. Other members of the GATT criticised
this procedure as they deemed notification via Art. XXIV GATT necessa-
ry.
248
ELR 2019 | No. 3 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000144
ted in Article 514 of the Resolution 2 adopted by the
LAFTA Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
LAIA has incurred much criticism regarding its inabili-
ty to promote economic integration and increase of trade
among its signatories. Unfortunately, during the 1980s,
economic and political crises seriously affected the
national development strategies of Latin American
countries. Currency devaluations and restrictions on
imports occurred, which curtailed any kind of integra-
tion progress and efforts to coordinate trade policies.
In summary, political and economic conditions during
the 1980s prevented LAIA from advancing towards its
objectives. Despite all the criticism against it, LAIA at
least promoted orientation concerning the procedural
rules to be respected in order to implement trade agree-
ments in the region. As Malamud affirms:15
was slightly more fruitful than its predecessor LAF-
TA. It simultaneously framed and constituted part of
the third wave of regional integration in Latin Ameri-
ca, of which Mercosur was to represent the most visi-
ble outcome.
Despite such a dismal outcome, LAIA’s good inten-
tions, to its credit, are documented and can be found
through consultation of the Itamaraty (the Brazilian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) archives. Documents from
the permanent Brazilian delegation to the Latin Ameri-
can Integration Association (BRASALADI) show that
LAIA has played a highly significant part, mainly con-
cerning negotiations of partial scope agreements and of
ECAs, related to either Mercosur or other Latin Ameri-
can countries. Some of these documents have revealed
the intention to revitalise Brazil’s importance in Latin
America and to promote its ties with the region.16
Under the LAIA ‘umbrella’ there are currently forty
partial scope agreements of economic complementarity
(PS.ECA) in force (Annex I). As previously mentioned,
Mercosur was protocolised at LAIA through the
PS.ECA 18, as on 26 March 1991, where the signature
of the Treaty of Asunción took place, establishing a
14. Among the rules are that negotiations may start, be concluded and exe-
cuted at any time of the year, and that member states shall notify the
Committee, as other member countries may have the intentions and,
thus, possibility to participate in it. Negotiations may start thirty days
after the date of notification to the Permanent Executive Committee,
and technical support of the Secretariat is granted to member states to
facilitate negotiations. Signatory member countries of the finished
agreement shall forward an authenticated copy to the Committee,
which will be immediately distributed to the other member countries. At
least once a year, member countries participating in a partial scope
agreement shall report to the Committee about the progress attained
pursuant to the undersigned commitments; at the same report they
must inform about any modification which may substantially change
the agreement’s text. Source: http://sice.oas.org/trade/Montev_tr/
resolute.asp#res2. Retrieved on 27 June 2019.
15. A. Malamud, ‘Presidential Democracies and Regional Integration. An
Institutional Approach to Mercosur (1985-2000)’(European University
Institute in Political and Social Sciences, PhD Thesis, Florence, March,
p. 53) (2003).
16. The present author made the consultation at the Itamaraty Historical
Archive in Brasília (Brazil).
Common Market of the South between the Republics of
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
It is not possible, however, to understand the history of
Mercosur’s integration without referring to its ‘found-
ing fathers’: the efforts of José Sarney and Raúl Alfon-
sín, the Presidents of Brazil and Argentina, respectively,
represent one of the leading factors that led to the devel-
opment of the bloc. Their influence can be traced back
to their assumed roles as tutors in the establishment of
Mercosur after the two countries signed the Declaration
of Iguaçu (1985) and entered the Brazil-Argentina Inte-
gration and Economics Co-operation Program (PICE)
in 1986 (see Annex II – Institutional Landmarks – Mer-
cosur’s history of integration). Remarkably, the PICE
was instrumental in establishing a partnership between
Brazil and Argentina, which saw both casting aside dic-
tatorships and, thereupon, establishing a much broader
idea of regional and market integration.17
At the time of Mercosur’s establishment in 1991, politi-
cal choices were indeed in favour of achieving a com-
mon market by 1994, as reflected in the name given to
the bloc, i.e. the Common Market of the South. Demo-
cratic regimes from Brazil and Argentina had shared a
common perception during the middle 1980s that a
regional framework could act as a parallel process to
worldwide multilateralization, enabling them to face
tasks that would otherwise remain impossible to deal
with.18 The concept of Mercosur was rooted in the
founding treaties of the mid-1980s and the political
intent of the then presidents of Brazil and Argentina.
Their intensive participation was pivotal in devising a
plan to lessen domestic pressures for increased military
spending through economic integration. They proposed
a progressive state-led initiative, an integration blue-
print whose aim was to build a ‘true community and not
just an (economic) association’.19
It initially set a progressive Trade Liberalisation Pro-
gramme, to be in force until 31 December 1994 (the first
stage, or the ‘period of transition’). The Treaty also pre-
viewed the implementation of a customs union and the
harmonisation of macroeconomic policies. The institu-
tional structure was composed of two main bodies dur-
ing the first period: The Common Market Council
(CMC) and the Common Market Group (CMG). It
contained five annexes: Annex I established the Trade
Liberalisation Programme, protocolised in LAIA by the
Partial Scope Economic Complementarity Agreement
(ECA) 18; Annex II defined a rule of origin for the
period of transition towards the customs union (until
1994); Annex III established that any dispute arising
between state parties as a result of treaty applications
17. V. Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America since Inde-
pendence, Cambridge University Press (1994).
18. S. Gratius & M.G. Saraiva, ‘Continental Regionalism: Brazil’s Prominent
Role in the Americas’, CEPS Working Document. No. 374 (February
2013).
19. R. Alfonsín, ‘La Integración Sudamericana: Una Cuestión Política’, 9(24)
Síntesis FUALI, 6 (2001) in A. Malamud, ‘Mercosur Turns 15: Between
Rising Rhetoric and Declining Achievement’, 18(3) Cambridge Review
of International Affairs 424 (2005).
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was to be settled by means of direct negotiations; Annex
IV safeguards measures; and Annex V provided for the
creation of working subgroups.
3 Mercosur’s Legal
Foundations and
Institutional Framework
The Treaty of Asunción (1991) was instrumental in the
founding of Mercosur and, furthermore, in the addition
of two other member countries, namely Paraguay and
Uruguay. It laid out the framework on which Merco-
sur’s core institutions were based and later established.
It also provided the principles for establishing a com-
mon market between the member nations through the
elimination of import and export fees. Moreover, the
Protocol of Ouro Preto (1994) was significant in
improving and reinforcing certain policies included in
the Treaty of Asunción (1991), and it was given credit
for making the Treaty legal as well as internationally
recognised. Needless to say, there were other important
treaties and protocols that were signed by the member
states, which were needed in order to adjust certain
aspects of the regional bloc. This can be attested to in
the Protocols of Brasília (1991) and Olivos (2002), in
which the focus was to improve the mechanism or pro-
cedure for dispute settlement within Mercosur (see
Annex III).
The establishment of the CMC and the CMG, as intra-
organisations of Mercosur, was the most beneficial and
significant aspect that the Treaty of Asunción (1991)
laid out. CMC is the highest decision-making body of
Mercosur, which comprises the ministers of economy
and foreign affairs of all member states. Here all deci-
sions taken must necessarily be unanimous for their
effective implementation. Baptista (2001)20 shows that
apart from decision-making, it is also responsible for
seeing to the strategic objectives laid out in the Treaty
of Asunción (1991) and in the Ouro Preto Protocol
(1994). The active participation of the Ministers in the
CMC indicates the progress and projected plans for the
future of Mercosur. There are four members and hence
only four to eight ministers assemble.21 Nowadays,
despite the loose links some countries hold within Mer-
cosur, they have the privilege of sending their represen-
tative to the CMC as acting officials. Although the
CMC is regarded as being the highest group or organi-
sation within Mercosur, many competencies of the
CMC have been delegated to the CMG. The former has
tried to maintain and perform its initial function as stat-
ed as its raison d’être from the start.
However, in the course of almost three decades, officials
heading the CMC have realised that their relative func-
20. L.O. Baptista, MERCOSUR, Its Institutions and Judicial Structure
(2001). Source: http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/geograph/south/mstit2_e.pdf.
21. Considering Venezuela’s suspension of the bloc since 2016.
tion is hindered by critical factors. Despite being the
highest organisation within Mercosur, officials are still
unable to be independent of certain factors that can
influence their decisions.22 Officials of the CMC are still
government officials who are under the influence of the
Presidents of their respective countries. In spite of its
highest possible position within Mercosur, this govern-
ing body fails to reach a consensus that is worthy of
being designated a ‘Mercosur decision’. Instead, each
decision is still based on pressing issues that each official
and his or her respective country is facing, persevering
in the hope that Mercosur can be of help to them in
order to alleviate or change certain conditions. Despite
their efforts, a neutral consensus can be impossible to
attain, owing to the practices of the political hierarchy
within the CMC itself. The effect is that the CMC is
having difficulty in achieving the medium- and long-
term strategic agenda of Mercosur, which is considered
to be paramount for the success of regional and market
integration.
CMG is the executive body, one of whose main tasks is
to implement the Council’s decisions. Ministers of for-
eign affairs from all member states control the executive
body, thus making it an intergovernmental organ.23
They can be seen to be instrumental in that their func-
tions consist of carrying out actions and decisions that
are necessary in terms of making Mercosur more legiti-
mate both regionally and internationally through effec-
tive governance. While the CMC seeks to fulfil its role
in approving or rejecting initiatives from its subgroups,
it has the executive power to regulate the decisions
made by the CMC and to administer it in order to guar-
antee that it is working properly and within the context
of the integration process.24 The CMG is the more cru-
cial and important of the two in terms of functions and
the number of negotiations. It could be considered as
being the developer of the building blocks, which are
necessary for the success of the integration process. The
CMG is composed of four incumbent and four alternate
members from each country,25 with officials coming
from the ministries of foreign affairs, economy and the
central bank of each county. Given the role and tasks
that the CMG needs to fulfil, there are eighteen work
subgroups that attend to key areas. There are thirteen
specialised assemblies, which focus on diverse issues
and twelve ad hoc groups that focus on special issues
such as the biotechnology and sugar sectors.26 All are
headed by national officers from each country.
The sharing of tasks has the goals of organising the
workload of the CMG and lessening the problems that
are usually associated with public administrations and
22. M. Mecham, ‘MERCOSUR: A Failing Development Project?’, 79(2)
International Affairs 369-387 (2003).
23. Another decision-making body is the Mercosur Trade Commission
(MTC), and its main role is to monitor external tariffs and solve trade-
related disputes. All three decision-making bodies of Mercosur are inter-
governmental.
24. Baptista, above n. 20.
25. Considering Venezuela’s suspension of the bloc since 2016.
26. To see the current organogram of Mercosur: www.mercosul.gov.br/
images/pdf/Organograma-MSUL.pdf.
250
ELR 2019 | No. 3 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000144
regional integration. This sharing is done through a
multiplicity of auxiliary organisations, supposedly
allowing the CMG to oversee multiple areas with
enough manpower, focus and resources that are critical
in policymaking. This set-up is ideal within a regional
bloc and makes it easier for Mercosur to address impor-
tant issues without facing too many problems. However,
it also has flaws, which have already been seen or mani-
fested in the CMG and its sub-organisations.27
In light of the complex structure of the CMG, the error
that can be observed is the lack of cooperation among
subgroups, specialised assemblies and ad hoc groups.
Owing to the complex structure and the numbers of
sub-organisations that CMG needs to manage, coopera-
tion is nearly impossible to attain, eventually leading to
work overload and pending issues that are in need of
attention. The overall outcome is that this lack of coop-
eration results in losses, not only financially, but also in
the fact that issues are being left without necessary poli-
cies or guidelines. In the case of Mercosur, institutions
are not as strong as those in the EU: despite the phe-
nomenon of such ‘institutional hypertrophy’, they lack
the autonomy (and budgetary ability) to implement
their decisions that will affect all member states. Con-
centration of power in the presidential realm is a charac-
teristic that can be found at every turn in Mercosur, as
we will see later. Most subgroups working under the
CMG eventually attain autonomy from other groups,
especially if the area of focus is somewhat foreign to the
CMG officials. Some of the aforementioned problems
exhibit the failure of the CMG, which could explain
why the organisation has lost its efficiency over the
years.
These two organs, the CMC and the CMG, are consid-
ered to be the driving force of the whole regional bloc of
Mercosur. As defined by the Treaty of Asunción (1991)
and the Protocol of Ouro Preto (1994), their role is to
implement the authority required to constantly shape
Mercosur as a regional bloc and as a new market for for-
eign and local investors. However, considering the expe-
rience and current position of the regional bloc, it was a
must to establish additional and specialised organisa-
tions within it.28 These organisations deal with issues,
policies and tasks that complement the decisions made
by the CMG and the CMC. As such, the concept was to
lessen the tasks of the CMG and of the CMC and to dif-
fuse the problems that usually arise during the regional
integration process, while enhancing work efficiency
through careful division of work. Thus, under the Pro-
tocol of Ouro Preto (1994), the Mercosur Trade Com-
mission (MTC),29 the Mercosur Administrative Secre-
27. Baptista, above n. 20.
28. R. Bouzas & H. Soltz, ‘Institutions and Regional Integration: The Case of
MERCOSUR’, in V.B. Thomas(ed.), Regional Integration in Latin Ameri-
ca and the Caribbean: The Political Economy of Open Regionalism,
University of London, The Brookings Institutions (2001) 1-25.
29. Baptista, above n. 20, at 64 emphasises that there are cases of norms
emanating from Mercosur bodies that are flawed in their origin because
they exceed the limits of the constituting treaties. He provides as an
example Decision 9/94, which created the Mercosur Trade Commission:
‘According to the Treaty of Asunción (1991), this body could not be
tariat (MAS), the Economic and Social Consultative
Forum (ESCF) and the Joint Parliamentary Commis-
sion (JPC)30 were further created to strengthen the deci-
sion and policymaking of Mercosur.
However, all of them were not established for the pur-
pose of exercising supranational powers. This limiting
factor is to be underlined as marking the main difference
between the EU and Mercosur. This was not the only
evidence of limitation. The Treaty of Asunción (1991)
was influential in defining limitations to all officials and
intra-organisations, ensuring that their interests and
objectives would not go beyond the established bound-
aries of their respective member states. Moreover, the
Treaty of Asunción (1991) was instrumental in prepar-
ing the framework for decision-making, whose basis
would always be a major consensus among member
states.
Although the implementation of the Treaty of Asunción
had been initially perceived as a promising means of
attaining an advanced stage of economic integration, it
would prove to be insufficient in achieving this end.
Although politically motivated, it did not contain any
political expression. Besides, political choices are muta-
ble, especially in more volatile and unstable countries.
The ‘Golden Age’ of Mercosur, from 1991 to 1998,
enjoyed increasing flows of foreign direct investments
and intra-regional trade. During this period, as Mala-
mud observed,
Total trade of member countries grew from 7 percent
of GDP to represent more than 11 percent. Mercosur
underpinned this increasing openness of its members’
economies: trade between Mercosur-4 and the rest of
the world was about 8 times that between the bloc’s
members in 1990.31
However, the end of this age saw member states, even
the smaller ones that had so far been more supportive in
deepening the integration process, become reluctant.
The three-year transition period from 1991 to 1994 had
not seen Mercosur evolve into a common market, as had
been envisaged. Instead, the Protocol of Ouro Preto
bestowed on Mercosur the permanent institutional
structure that was a blueprint for a customs union to be
in place by 2000. The customs union has remained
incomplete to this day.
Concerning the legal provisions in Mercosur, the Treaty
of Asunción (1991) originally delineated its institutional
framework. The Treaty comprises five annexes that
created by Decision of the Mercosur Council. Consequent objections as
to its validity led to its incorporation into the Protocol of Ouro Preto’.
In: Baptista, above n. 20.
30. The Joint Parliamentary Commission was substituted by the Parliament
of Mercosur, which was established on 6 December 2006. On 7 May
2007, sitting of the Opening Session, when Mercosur parliamentarians
took their positions (18 representatives per country, as indicated by
their respective national parliaments). See www.parlamentodel
MERCOSUR.org.
31. A. Malamud, ‘The Internal Agenda of Mercosur: Interdependence,
Leadership and Institutionalization’, in Los nuevos enfoques de la inte-
gración: más allá del regionalism, Grace Jaramillo (Ed.) Quito, FLACSO
120 (2008).
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have codified the following: a transitory method for
intrazonal protection; a generalised, straight and auto-
matic programme for the removal of intrazonal charges;
schematic rules of origin; groups to work on the man-
agement of specific economic policies; and a specific
period for the setting up of a conflict resolution mecha-
nism. The traditional interpretation of the Treaty of
Asunción suggests that it be a ‘framework treaty’ to be
completed by the secondary legislation that would be
filled up or composed of the Mercosur bodies. How-
ever, in reality, it has not worked as originally con-
ceived. There are two main reasons for this. First, some
of the exhaustive laws, as framed by the Mercosur bod-
ies, for example, the protocols on investment, services
or competition, are primary laws rather than secondary
ones, primary laws being international treaties simply
annexed to the Asunción Treaty and sanctioned using
the same methods. Being international treaties, they
must follow internalisation procedures and be ratified.
Second, the most significant achievement of Mercosur
is the functioning of the primary law that removed
intrazonal tariffs. On the other hand, the categorisation
of certain laws as really being secondary laws in nature
has proven to be rather ineffective. Primary laws are
mainly international treaties annexed to the Treaty of
Asunción, with secondary laws being more a part of
Mercosur. With this in mind, the next section focuses
on the legal nature of Mercosur’s secondary legisla-
tions.32
4 Legal Nature of Mercosur’s
Secondary Legislation
The legal nature of Mercosur’s secondary legislations is
not easily determinable. Owing to the ongoing political
and academic debates on the characteristics of EU law
and regional integration legislation, it is essential to
understand the concepts behind EU laws and regional
integration. Most of the debates have centred on the
idea that EU laws and regional integration laws act as
being intermediate between the laws of the individual
and the national laws. This leads to confusion while
framing laws for the state and subsequently making
them applicable to individuals. This brings to the fore
one of the major hurdles for regional integration law,
namely the framing of legislations for states that will
eventually be applicable to individuals. The theory of
supranationalism, as a distinct characteristic of Europe-
an integration, has further added to the confusion. The
difference between intergovernmentalism and suprana-
tionalism refers to the presence or absence of an inter-
32. R. Bouzas et al., In-Depth Analysis of MERCOSUR Integrations, Its Pro-
spectives and the Effects Thereof on the Market, Access of EU Goods,
Services and Investment, Observatory of Globalisation, University of
Barcelona – Science Park of Barcelona (November 2002). Source:
www.sciencespo.fr/opalc/sites/sciencespo.fr.opalc/files/in-depth
%20analysis%20of%20mercosur%20integration.pdf.
national procedure to frame laws that oblige a state,
which is separate from a ratification, national acceptance
act or internalisation. This has been confused with the
matter of the composition of the institutions that frame
such laws, on the one hand, and with their legal effects
on individuals, on the other. Take the case of the former
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for
example, which was considered an intergovernmental
body, owing to the lack of an autonomous body to for-
mulate new laws, wherein any new NAFTA laws or
modifications would result in a new Treaty. However,
EU Treaties cannot be directly labelled as being supra-
national in nature. This is because while EU Treaties
have a supranational system that can frame laws, the
Treaty itself, being an international one (similar to for-
mer NAFTA), produces a series of legal obligations on
its members without any interference from the suprana-
tional organs.33
When there are procedures for creating supranational
laws, the legal nature is not based on the type of institu-
tions that frame these laws or on the processes that are
adopted by these institutions. EU law, which is primari-
ly supranational in nature, does not change in nature
because it is the intergovernmental Council that enacts
it. Similarly, EU law does not amend itself on the basis
of whether the Council works by voting a majority or
unanimous decision and remains the same even while it
may be the Commission or the Council that is enacting
the law. When the framing of integration law is com-
plete and enforced, the question then arises as to its
direct application to an individual. Traditionally it is
believed that EU law, once framed, becomes directly
applicable. However, this is true only with regulations,
while the primary laws and directives are not directly
applicable. The EU frames laws primarily through
regulations in specific fields, such as financial issues,
trade policies and agriculture, while in other areas it leg-
islates via directives, as for example in issues related to
the reconciliation of domestic legislation. It must be
noted that there are legal provisions within the EU that
cannot be applied directly to individuals. Instead, they
can be used within the level of community or domestic
jurisdictions. There are also some laws that fail – only
apparently – to produce any direct impact; neither are
they directly applicable. In this context it can be stated
that EU directives cannot be directly applied to the
individual.34 With EU laws likely to turn into ‘laws for
33. J. Jackson, The World Trading System, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press
(1997).
34. Unlike EU treaties and EU regulations, EU directives are not directly
applicable. When passed they need a piece of legislation to turn them
into national law. However, if the state fails to implement a directive
within the time given by the EU then an individual can take the state to
court for non-implementation. Therefore, originally, the directives do
not presuppose the direct effect, but they acquire such an effect in the
relation between the individual and the member state, as the latter
maintains itself inert vis-à-vis the adoption of necessary measures for
the application of such directives. On the other hand, it should be noted
that, diversely, the descending vertical applicability of the direct effect
does not take place, i.e., in the member state-individual way, insofar as
the individual may not be forced to act in a certain manner even if his
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the individual’, the member states must necessarily not
only enforce them, but also frame a piece of national law
that bears the standardised subject matter of the direc-
tives so that the content is passed onto individuals, bear-
ing similar characteristics and conditions as any other
domestic legislation.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has concentrated
mainly on the question of whether domestic laws that
are essential to give EU directives complete applicability
to individuals have been framed or not. In some cases,
however, it has been seen that provisions found within
the EU directives have a direct effect, despite lacking
immediate applicability. It must be noted that the ECJ
does not acknowledge direct effect to a complete legisla-
tion but only to particular provisions. This is mainly
because, unlike immediate applicability, direct effect is
not based on the official nature of the legislation, but on
the actual subject matter of a provision.35
This is in contrast to the system that operates in Merco-
sur. Authoritative powers of Mercosur’s organisations
remain strictly intergovernmental, as they do not have
any supranational authority or direct effect. Directives
from the MTC, decisions from the CMC and resolu-
tions from the CMG are not directly applicable within
the legal framework of each member state but must be
ratified by them to come into force.
As we have analysed the situation of the ratification and
applicability of all treaties and protocols signed among
Mercosur member states and also with associated states
from 1991 until the 15 July 2019, of all the 153 treaties
already signed less than half were in force (74). More
precisely, sixty-three were pending, ten derogated and
six not in force, as Table 1 shows.
Table 1 Signed treaties (in force; not in force; pending;
derogated)
In force 74
Not in force 6
Pending 63
Derogated 10
Total of signed treaties (up to 15 July 2019) 153
Elaborated by the present author, based on consultation at the
website of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Paraguay.
Source:www.mre.gov.py/tratados/public_web/
ConsultaMercosur.aspx. Retrieved on 15 July 2019.
Until 15 July 2019, there were eight treaties that were
signed before 2000 for which ratification was still pend-
ing. Currently, the oldest is the Protocol on Promotion
or her own country of origin did not regulate the application of the
directive.
35. D. Ventura & A. Perotti, El processo legislativo del MERCOSUR, Uru-
guai, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (2004).
and Protection of Investments coming from Non-Mer-
cosur State Parties, which was signed on 5 August 1994.
The nature of ‘secondary’ law in Mercosur remained
obscure until the early 1990s, and because of this, Arti-
cles 38-42 of the Protocol of Ouro Preto (POP)36 aimed
at clarifying the situation. As per Article 40, for simulta-
neous applicability in all member states, the legal acts in
Mercosur can be enforced only a month after the
Administrative Secretariat announces their internalisa-
tion by all member states.37
Under Article 40, two matters are seen to tend to over-
lap, one pertaining to the applicability of Mercosur leg-
islation as national law and the other to its applicability
to individuals. This overlapping tends to produce three
varying interpretations. The first interpretation (a) is
highlighted in the third arbitration award that was
passed in relation to the conflict between Brazil and
Argentina in 2000 (in the matter of safeguards), where it
was interpreted that the law can be enacted only after it
has been incorporated into domestic law along with all
the necessary notifications. Consequently, until then,
the legislation remains effective, neither as a law for
individuals nor as one for the states. Another interpreta-
tion (b) was highlighted in the fourth arbitration award-
ed on the conflict between Argentina and Brazil in 2001
on matters of poultry-related anti-dumping procedures.
According to this interpretation, later adopted by many
awards, the legislation cannot enter into force on indi-
viduals, since the procedure must start at the same time
in all member states and the transposition along with all
notification processes must be ready. This award also
objectified that member states must internalise the legis-
lation before a specific date and that if a member state
failed to do so, then it can be challenged by the other
members.
Some experts have contended that the third interpreta-
tion (c) takes Mercosur back towards the EU, with
regard to its nature of directives. However, this is not
entirely correct, as this interpretation clearly expresses
that the legislation does not become effective until all
the member states incorporate it into their national law.
Therefore, it can be assumed that if a new legislation
fails to be internalised by all the members, the previous-
ly existing legislation will remain effective and hold true
for all member states (even those that have already
internalised the legislation).
In this context, there are three points to be considered
that would help to understand the legal nature of the
secondary laws of Mercosur. The first point refers to
the situation where differences between the interpreta-
tions become indistinct. This happens when all Merco-
sur member states have internalised the legislations.
The differences become distinct only when one or more
member states refuse to meet their obligations. The
differences between the two interpretations also ease out
36. www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/ourop/ourop_e.asp.
37. In fact, it takes on average, between six to ten years for all member
states to internalise the legislation. Concerning the recent EU-Mercosur
trade agreement, signed on 28 June 2019, the road to ratification by all
28 EU and 4 Mercosur countries also seems to be a long one.
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when, instead of restricting, the law provides rights to
individuals, or a provision does not block the member
states from enacting provisions that are more open in
nature. The differences are exposed only when a new
provision blocks individual rights. The second point to
be considered is that dissimilarities between the inter-
pretations become prominent during changes in the law
of integration. As per the second interpretation, a new
law can enter into force only after the hesitant member
state agrees to move ahead and comply. As per the third
interpretation, the opposite happens, and the new legis-
lation becomes applicable when the most interested
member state transmutes or transposes the law.
In summary, it is possible to identify two general prob-
lems concerning the legislative process of Mercosur.
The first one refers to the internal incompatibility
among the different levels of Mercosur law, as well as an
external incompatibility concerning both the confronta-
tion between Mercosur and member states’ laws and
Mercosur and international laws. The second problem
refers to the difficulty of the internalisation of laws to
national legal systems, which carries legal regional
uncertainty and the absence of interpretation and the
uniform application of Mercosur laws.38
5 Mercosur and the EU’s
Impact
The path to integration in Europe is quite different
from that which leads to Mercosur. On 1 July 1968 –
only seventeen years after the signature of the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty (18 April
1951), the EU Customs Union was completed. In Mer-
cosur, ‘Lists of Exceptions’ were envisaged to the Com-
mon External Tariff (CET), as instruments to allow
member states to apply different import tax rates than
those provided by the CET. Such lists persist although
Mercosur has almost thirty years of existence. Accord-
ing to the Decision 26/15 about the List of Exception
issued from the CMC, these lists should contain: 1) a
maximum of 100 Mercosur Common Nomenclature
(MCN) codes in the case of Argentina and Brazil, until
31 December 2021; 2) 649 codes in the case of Paraguay,
until 31 December 2023; and 3) 225 codes in the case of
Uruguay and Venezuela, until 31 December 2022.39
38. Ventura & Perotti, above n. 35.
39. The main sectors/products from each country: a) Argentina: chemicals
and petrochemicals; pulp and paper; steel; shoes; b) Brazil: chemicals
and petrochemicals, food, textiles, hygiene and cleaning products,
leather and wood products; c) Paraguay: chemicals and petrochemicals,
steel, food, tobacco; d) Uruguay: chemicals and petrochemicals. Up to
now, there are still special regimes for sugar, automotive and textile
products; the capital goods, telecommunication equipment and com-
puting machinery sectors did not achieve the expected convergence.
According to the Argentine newspaper Clarín: ‘these exceptions have
ended up piercing the common tariff until it becomes an empty shell.
Today, about two out of three of the extra-regional imports of Merco-
sur are not governed by the CET, keeping the bloc away from the
objective of greater integration. Thus, far from moving towards a cus-
Besides, member states may unilaterally modify, up to
20%, the number of their respective exceptions every
six months, according to Article 3 of the CMC Decision
58/10. According to Meyer:
While the bloc was created with the intention of
incrementally advancing toward full economic inte-
gration, only a limited customs union has been ach-
ieved thus far. The group has also been plagued by
internal disputes and frequent rule changes. Instead
of serving as a platform for insertion into the global
economy as originally envisioned, Mercosur has
evolved into a more protectionist arrangement,
shielding its members from external competition.40
The automotive sector, for example, is one of some key
industries for both Argentina and Brazil economies, and
since the creation of Mercosur it has been regulated
through a parallel managed trade agreement. This is one
kind of adaptation by Mercosur to maintain the viability
of some areas related to trade.41
It is evident that Mercosur still has much work to do in
evolving towards a ‘perfect’ customs union. The Euro-
pean experience is still a model that Mercosur
sometimes even tries to replicate, especially in the build-
ing process and in the methodology of the implementa-
tion of several of its policies. The characteristics that
corroborate the emulation of the EU model are revealed
in Mercosur’s content and form. Content is seen in the
sectoral cooperation and integration between involved
countries in Mercosur, such as Brazil and Argentina.
Before the developments of the 1980s, countries in Mer-
cosur had followed a policy of progressive liberalisation
of trade and had pursued a possession goal, which envis-
aged the establishment of a common market for goods,
services and capital and labour. Policymakers for Mer-
cosur have also adopted a regulatory approach towards
market integration, applying norms and market stand-
ards similar to those of the EU. Originally, the develop-
ment of regional integration in Mercosur followed the
EU’s ambitious and gradual plan for economic integra-
tion, which had already yielded some benefits in the late
1990s. Moreover, Mercosur consolidated the involve-
ment between Brazil and Argentina, dating back to the
1980s. Mercosur was an ambitious project of a full com-
mon market and with political and security policy coor-
dination that was shown to be very dynamic, especially
until 1998.
In terms of form, emulation is clearly revealed in the
institutional framework underlying the EU model, with
certain differences based on the distinctive characteris-
toms union, four separate customs territories remain in Mercosur,
where intraregional trade remains subject to rules of origin.’ Source:
https://www.clarin.com/economia/hora-discutir-arancel-externo-
comun-mercosur_0_HJdKY8Xyz.html. Retrieved on 27 June 2019.
40. P.J. Meyer, ‘Brazil-U.S. Relations’, Congressional Research Service
(CRS) Report of Congress, 11 February 2016, at: https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/row/RL33456.pdf. Retrieved on 4 November 2018, p. 12ff.
41. N. Pose & L. Bizzozero,‘Regionalismo, economía política y geopolítica:
tensiones y desafíos en la nueva búsqueda de inserción internacional del
Mercosur’, 28(1) Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política 249-278 (2019).
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tics of the region. The positions and the designs for each
commission bear a close resemblance to those of the EU.
The function of each commission or group, such as the
CMG, is the same as in the EU, yet again with certain
differences in composition and regional characteristics.42
Resemblance to the EU can also be found in the realm
of principles, such as those linked to human rights. In
2009 Mercosur created the Institute for Human Rights
Policies, a regional organisation with the goal of provid-
ing technical cooperation and assistance in the formula-
tion, design, implementation and articulation of public
policies on human rights.43 In Europe, the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights44 entered into force on
1 December 2009 and became legally binding on the EU
institutions and on national governments.
During the creation of Mercosur, the policymakers
faced a high degree of uncertainty owing mainly to the
lack of experience in the field of region building, aggra-
vated by the rapidly changing context of the inter-
national community after the Cold War. The European
model was elected, in the light of its achievements and
success, in the hope that it would be applicable and that
its creation would generate benefits comparable to those
of the European model. According to Lenz,45 the con-
cept of mimetic isomorphism describes Mercosur’s
adoption of the European model.
Owing to the degree of uncertainty and the availability
of other models for regional integration, policymakers of
Mercosur have chosen to emulate organisations that
have shown experience, legitimacy and positive results
in their development. During the institutional growth of
Mercosur as a regional bloc, the concept of mimetic iso-
morphism has prevailed. Casola46 believes that isomor-
phism, also known as the institutional homogenisation
of Mercosur, increases over time. In this sense, as both
blocs market similar products and services, they are
connected and could even become structurally equiva-
lent in due course through repeated interactions.47
Schimmelfennig48 affirms that non-member actors imi-
tate the EU because they recognise EU rules and poli-
cies as appropriate solutions to their own problems.
It was expected that uncertainty and indecisiveness
would surface in dealing with regionalism, since the
42. L. Casola, Mercosur: From the Open Regionalism of 1990’s to a Model
of Post Liberal Integration. Paper Presented in the conference of New
Latin American Development strategies in a changing international eco-
nomic and political context, Aalborg University, Denmark (2008).
43. CMC Decision 14/09 issued on 24 July 2009. Source: http://
Mercosur.ippdh.Mercosur.int/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/
DEC_014-2009_PT_Inst-Politicas-Pub-Direitos-Humanos.pdf. Retrieved
on 6 November 2018.
44. Adopted in 2000 and binding on EU countries since 2009.
45. T. Lenz, Problematizing the EU’s model of Export to MERCOSUR:
Strategies and Motivations. Paper Presented at the Garnet conference,
‘The European Union in International Affairs’, Brussels (2008).
46. Casola, above n. 42.
47. The number of repeated interactions will certainly increase during the
next years, as Mercosur and the EU signed, on 28 June 2019, a Free
Trade Agreement, as we will see later.
48. F. Schimmelfennig, ‘Europeanization beyond Europe’, 10(1) Living
Reviews in European Governance (2015). Source: http://
europeangovernance-livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2015-1.
range of models during that time was limited. However,
the ‘power of attraction’ of the EU model, which is
composed primarily of legitimacy, combined with its
history of achievements, culminated in strong factors
over which policymakers deliberated not only in Brazil
and Argentina, but also in other countries envisaging
regionalism. It seems that it has become a common
practice for policymakers to look upon the EU as an
appropriate paradigm for the establishment of regional-
ism and customs unions, by virtue of the fact that it had
become the first regional bloc to achieve the two, thus
making it a worthy reference point.
Regional institutionalisation and regional market build-
ing have been the two core objectives of Mercosur and
have been the focus of the EU’s support, as shown dur-
ing its active promotion of regionalism. Each objective
has been parallel to the pursuit of long-term geopolitical
interests of the EU, not only in the region, but also in
other parts of the world. As seen, the EU has provided
support in the development of Mercosur’s regional
institutionalisation and regional market building. To
begin with, it directly supported Mercosur by reinforc-
ing its personnel, lending staff and technical support,
while initiating funds for Mercosur’s pursuit of regional
institutionalisation. As Kanner affirms,
Since the very inception of Mercosur, the European
Union has strongly supported and continues to sup-
port integration in the Southern Cone. The number
one proponent of regional integration in the world is
the European Union, and this internationally
respected organization announced in August 2002
that it will give €200 million to the countries of Mer-
cosur between 2002 and 2006.49
Besides, in the field of regional market building, the
EU’s support focused on the reciprocal liberalisation of
trade and on the preparation of the region for economic
and political association with other regional blocs and
countries around the world.
Changes in agreements and objectives affected the sup-
port that was flowing to the region. Technical and
financial assistance in the region was narrowly focused
on economic integration and trade-related matters that
were in the interest of the EU.50 Nevertheless, this
option had little success, and the Union had begun to
initiate alternative routes that could provide develop-
ments and improvements in its favour.51 These alterna-
tive routes have opened the path for a strategic partner-
ship between the countries under Mercosur’s control.
As a result, on 4 July 2007, the European Commission
proposed to launch a strategic partnership with Brazil at
the first EU-Brazil Summit in Lisbon.
49. A. Kanner, ‘European Union-Mercosur Relations: The Institutionaliza-
tion of Cooperation’, 1(8) Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 9
(October 2002).
50. Lenz, above n. 45.
51. A. Malamud, ‘Presidentialism and Mercosur: A Hidden Cause for a Suc-
cessful Experience’, in Finn Laursen (ed.), Comparative Regional Inte-
gration: Theoretical Perspectives, Aldershot, Ashgate (2001).
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Although a bilateral set-up has advantages that are
clearly not present in a bi-regional framework, the rela-
tionship of the EU and Mercosur was the focus for the
creation of a regional market. Plans in this direction
were in the hands of the Bi-Regional Negotiations Com-
mittee (BNC), where delegations from Mercosur and
the EU held rounds of negotiations for more than two
decades. More recently, the two blocs intensified the
negotiations towards the signature of a Free Trade
Agreement, as part of a broader association agreement
between the two regions; finally, on 28 June 2019, Mer-
cosur and the EU reached a trade agreement. According
to the EU release,
The new trade framework – part of a wider Associa-
tion Agreement between the two regions – will con-
solidate a strategic political and economic partnership
and create significant opportunities for sustainable
growth on both sides.52
6 Mercosur in Practice –
Successes and Failures
As already mentioned, the purpose of the Treaty of
Asunción of 26 March 1991 was the creation of a com-
mon market among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay. It was to be gradually built through the
implementation of a free-trade zone, which, in turn, was
to be accomplished by 31 December 1994. A customs
union – with the establishment of a CET53 – was to
enter into force on 1 January 1995. In order to ensure
fair competition among member states, barriers to trade
among them were to be eliminated, and common trade
policies towards third countries were to be adopted. In
addition, macroeconomic and sectoral policies were to
be harmonised.
A Trade Liberalisation Programme, in Annex 1 of the
Treaty of Asunción, contained a schedule for the pro-
gressive, linear and automatic elimination of tariffs.
This schedule started on 30 June 1991 and was wound
up on 31 December 1994. Furthermore, the programme
stipulated the possibility of excluding some products
from the tariff reduction schedule, taking into consider-
ation the differences in the levels of competitiveness.
The numbers of goods excluded per member state were
listed as follows: Argentina – 394, Brazil – 324, Para-
guay – 439 and Uruguay – 960. However, the number of
goods per member state had to be reduced by 20% per
year in order to finally achieve a free-trade zone by the
end of 1994. The end of December 1995 was the dead-
line set for Paraguay and Uruguay. The previous dead-
line, end of December 1994, for the elimination of non-
52. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2039&title=EU-
and-Mercosur-reach-agreement-on-trade. Retrieved on 28 June 2019.
53. The CET started in 1995 to Argentina and Brazil, and in 1996 to Para-
guay and Uruguay; it covered about 85% of all products and tariffs
ranging from 0 until 20%, with an average of 11%. Lists of exceptions
were allowed, for both sensitive goods and sectors.
tariff barriers, was changed to June 1995. The Trade
Liberalisation Programme was not fully respected, as
some goods remained under an adaptation regime
defined by Decision 5/94 of the CMC. Concerning the
sensitive areas, the auto industry and sugar production
had initially been left out of the Trade Liberalisation
Programme, but both had, at the beginning of the
2000s, reduced and eliminated tariffs for intra-Mercosur
trade. On 30 June 2000, a presidential communiqué was
issued defending the participation of sugar in the CET
and the free-trade zone but included no concrete pro-
posals related to this matter. Despite being a major issue
among the members of Mercosur, no significant
improvement with regard to cooperation or integration
was experienced.
Despite a condition of internal protectionism and
restrictions, member states, especially during the 2000s,
supported the creation of new organs, such as the Par-
liament, the Democracy Observatory, the Institute for
Public Policy and Human Rights and the Social Insti-
tute and the Structural Convergence Fund.54 So far,
despite the creation of these mechanisms to empower
civil society and to decrease asymmetries, their effec-
tiveness has largely been restricted. According to Espi-
no:
the full democratization of decision-making areas in
terms of social and gender issues has not yet been
accomplished. This is true not only in consideration
of the need for greater and wider participation of
social actors, but also in terms of taking them into
account when drafting proposals and evaluating the
economic and commercial evolution of Mercosur.55
Thus, it seems that it would be more productive if
member states had focused on the induction to the mod-
ernisation of the productive system and on institutional
and sectoral reforms. An integration process necessarily
involves productive modifications and efforts to adjust-
ments of the production, investment and marketing
plans of domestic enterprises. However, major differ-
ences in macroeconomic policies (fiscal, monetary and
exchange rate ones) persisted, and member states
remained protecting domestic groups related to sensi-
tive sectoral policies.
Intrinsic characteristics of member states largely influ-
ence the integration process in Mercosur. Another
recurrent problem of member states in Mercosur is
related not only to the external environment, but also to
their unstable domestic situation, both politically and
54. The social dimension of the bloc arose from them on, through the crea-
tion of some other mechanisms/institutions, such as: the Mercosur Insti-
tute for Public Policy and Human Rights (Decision CMC No. 40/04); the
Constitutive Protocol of the Mercosur Parliament (2005); the Mercosur
Social Summits (held since 2006); the Mercosur Democracy Observato-
ry (Decision CMC No. 24/06); the Coordination Commission for Social
Affairs Ministers (Decision CMC No. 45/10); and the Mercosur Social
Participation Support Unit) (Decision CMC No. 65/10).
55. A. Espino, ‘Impacting MERCOSUR’s Gender Policies: Experiences, Les-
sons Learned, and the Ongoing Work of Civil Society in Latin America’,
in Forum International de Montreal (2008).
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economically. As internal problems arise, Mercosur is
relegated to oblivion – member states seem to continue
to act unilaterally, taking protectionist measures, show-
ing disagreement and avoiding commitment to the
established institutional structure of the bloc.
In addition, the current institutional framework of Mer-
cosur does not oblige member states to coordinate their
foreign policies. In sum, as Murcia56 affirms,
The institutionality of integration has great designs
but the binding weakness of the agreements, the
limited capacity of some Member States and the lack
of will of the governments cause the failure of these
integration models.
The absence of coordination in the macroeconomic
realm is patent. As Canuto et al.57 concluded:
Under the customs union element of Mercosur,
Argentina and Brazil apply the same general tariff on
imports from third countries not party to the agree-
ment. Yet, the experience since 1990 has been dozens
of examples like the one of Brazil (but not Argentina)
using antidumping to restrict steel imports from Chi-
na. The lack of coordination in their applied trade
policy toward third countries questions the extent to
which they are really involved in a meaningful cus-
toms union. Under the FTA element of Mercosur,
Argentina and Brazil apply a general tariff of zero on
imports from each other. Yet, experience since 1990
has been dozens of examples like the one of Argentina
imposing a separate, antidumping import restriction
on imports from Brazil of fabrics.
In fact, macroeconomic coordination remains a chal-
lenge to Mercosur’s member countries. In June 2019,
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro suggested that Brazil
and Argentina could have a single currency akin to the
euro. Brazil’s Economy Minister Paulo Guedes cited the
example of Germany and said the nations would first
need to make fiscal adjustments to reap the benefit of
increased competitiveness from a common currency.58
Some hours later the Central Bank of Brazil issued a
statement denying there are ongoing plans or even
studies for a monetary union with Argentina. In fact,
such a suggestion was perceived as a ‘joke’, ‘unrealistic’
and a ‘delirium’ in both countries, as they are facing dis-
crepancies in their conditions – for instance, while Bra-
zil currently has a buffer of international reserves that
exceeds US$380 billion, Argentina received the biggest
56. B.A. Murcia, ‘Why Has Not Integration Been Possible in Latin Ameri-
ca?’, 22 September 2018. https://latinamericanpost.com/23467-why-
has-not-integration-been-possible-in-latin-america. Retrieved on 11
July 2019.
57. O. Canuto, C. Fleischhaker, P. Schellekens, P. Elle & J. Remes, ‘MER-
COSUR is not really a free trade agreement, let alone a customs union’
(2016).
58. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-07/a-common-
brazil-argentina-currency-a-distant-mirage-for-now. Retrieved on 2 July
2019.
loan ever (US$57 billion) from the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) in 2018.59
Mercosur’s institutions are unable to perform their orig-
inal tasks. When problems arise, the executive branches
of the member states come to determine dispute resolu-
tion. ‘Regional’ feeling among the member states, which
should go beyond trade issues, is shown to be lacking in
this scenario. Telò analyses a series of complications
working against Mercosur’s integration path and con-
cludes that:
This situation not only shows the current level of dis-
agreement between member states, but also clearly
reveals the inability on behalf of Mercosur’s institu-
tions to provide a platform for resolving differences
between member states. For all the above reasons,
Mercosur appears weaker now than at the end of the
twentieth century.60
Because of the frequent absence of supranational bodies,
negotiations must be entered into by the President, who
must show his or her capabilities in taking the particular
issue in hand in order to bind the member states of the
regional grouping in a proper, appropriate way. The
Presidents often replace the Dispute Settlement Mecha-
nism (DSM)61 of Mercosur. Under the functioning of
the Protocol of Brasília (1991) for the Settlement of Dis-
putes in Mercosur, ten awards were delivered by the
Mercosur ad hoc arbitration tribunals. Under the func-
tioning of the Protocol of Olivos for the Settlement of
Disputes in Mercosur (2002), two awards were deliv-
ered by ad hoc arbitration tribunals, and six awards were
delivered by the permanent review tribunal (PRT). The
PRT may act as the sole instance in certain cases;
besides, it also reviews the decisions of the ad hoc arbi-
tration tribunals. Most of the disputes that arrived at the
PRT after its creation were exactly related to appeals,
through the hearing of the cases in the first instance
(awards from the ad hoc arbitration tribunals). The
original intention of the creation of the PRT was to fur-
nish a uniform interpretation of the body of legislation
of Mercosur, including the establishment of a common
jurisprudence, which could give greater legal certainty
to the whole integration process.
Concerning the appeals specifically, Article 17 (2) of the
Protocol of Olivos (PO)62 explicitly states that the
appeal is limited to questions of law, including the legal
interpretations of the ad hoc arbitration tribunals. In
addition, Article 22 of the same protocol affirms that the
59. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/26/argentina-imf-
biggest-loan. Retrieved on 2 July 2019.
60. M. Telò, European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and
Global Governance in a Post-hegemonic Era, Hampshire, England, Ash-
gate Publishing Limited., 2nd ed. (2007), at 174.
61. The DSM, or Dispute Settlement Mechanism, in the absence of a judi-
cial body, is the closest representation of a supreme court or judicial
institution in a regional bloc or other international organisation. Merco-
sur’s DSM, originally created under the Treaty of Asunción, was later
amended through the Protocol of Brasília (PB) and upgraded with the
Protocol of Olivos (PO).
62. www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/mercosur-treaties-
and-protocols/116-protocolo-de-olivos.
257
Ricardo Caichiolo doi: 10.5553/ELR.000144 - ELR 2019 | No. 3
scope of the review is to confirm, modify or revoke the
legal basis of decisions of the ad hoc arbitral tribunals.
Thus, the role played by the review is restrictive, with
exclusive analysis over the question of law and avoid-
ance of debates over the questions of fact. The decision
derived from the review will be definitive and will sub-
stitute the original one, delivered by the ad hoc arbitra-
tion tribunal.
Although the DSM of Mercosur apparently seems to
have been successful in terms of dealing with the few
disputes that have occurred since its creation, such effi-
ciency is hardly apparent. First, and perhaps most
importantly, the possibility of introducing forum choice
for the settlement of disputes has brought a certain
amount of discredit to the existent DSM. Forum choice
adds another level of uncertainty and in many ways
indicates distrust of the Mercosur DSM – neither of
these aspects is beneficial for longer-term institutionali-
sation. In the dispute DS355 concerning ‘Anti-dumping
Measures on Imports of Certain Resins’, Argentina
requested consultations with Brazil directly in the
World Trade Organization (WTO), bypassing the DSM
of Mercosur, which shows its lack of legitimacy, even
among members of the bloc.63 This was not the first
time: in two other disputes in WTO at the beginning of
the 2000s Brazil was the complainant and Argentina the
respondent: DS190 (Argentina – Transitional Safeguard
Measures on Certain Imports of Woven Fabric Products
of Cotton and Cotton Mixtures Originating in Brazil)
and DS241 (Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Duties on Poultry from Brazil).64
As we analyse the increase in the participation of the
private sector in the economies of the member states, we
note that it has involved specific parties, concerning
particular disputes. Most of these disputes have
involved Argentina and Brazil; besides, the greatest part
of the most important disputes, involving the private
sectors, were solved according to an informal nature of
decision-making processes, which has also been an
intrinsic characteristic of the definition of integration
policies within the bloc. This informal nature, based on
political negotiation among high-level officials, has nat-
63. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: DISPUTE DS355. Brazil – Anti-dumping Meas-
ures on Imports of Certain Resins from Argentina. ‘On 26 December
2006, Argentina requested consultations with Brazil concerning anti-
dumping measures applied by Brazil to imports of certain polyethylene
terephthalate (PET) resins from Argentina. Argentina considers that the
anti-dumping investigation conducted, the determination made and the
duties imposed by Brazil are inconsistent. On 4 February 2008, the
Chairman of the Panel informed the DSB that Argentina had indicated
that on 29 January 2008, the Foreign Trade Chamber of Brazil had
adopted a decision to suspend the application of anti-dumping duties
on imports of PET resin from Argentina. Therefore, Argentina asked the
Panel to suspend its work pursuant to Article 12.12 of the DSU. The
Panel agreed to this request and suspended its work until further notice.
Since the panel had not been requested to resume its work, pursuant to
Article 12.12 of the DSU, the authority for the establishment of the
panel lapsed as of 5 February 2009.’ Source: https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds355_e.htm. Retrieved on 28 June
2019.
64. Source: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds
190_e.htm; https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds241_e.htm.
urally had an impact over the DSM of Mercosur, grad-
ually rendering it largely ignored. Another intrinsic
characteristic of the dynamics in Mercosur is that often
in the past disputes between member states have
remained unsolved. The option for avoiding confronta-
tion, which would threaten the political understanding
among member states, has compelled them to come to a
modus vivendi over these disputes, as a means of avoid-
ing the likelihood of a deterioration in their relations.
As previously noted, the discussions, with regard to the
main issues that have affected Mercosur, ever since its
inception, have shown the option that the member states
have taken in order to resolve disputes among them-
selves. They have tended to resort to Presidential
Diplomacy,65 whereby only the heads of state handle the
negotiations without much regard for the institutions
established by the treaties that also created Mercosur. In
addition, there are numerous other difficulties in
improving an integration process when member states
have a variety of structural differences and economic
policies. It is no trivial task to reduce asymmetries and
implement regulatory convergence, mainly during polit-
ical and economic crises experienced by countries.
The power of the Presidents to resolve the disputes is
generally brought about by the same power that they
possess in the local setting of their countries. Consider-
ing this, negotiations undertaken do not generally con-
form to the standards of Mercosur. The DSM of Mer-
cosur remains too highly politicised and lacks sufficient
jurisdictional power on integration issues to guarantee
its role in preventing and containing the violation of
regulations. However, it seems that the creation of a
supranational body would not change such politicisa-
tion. It would probably be ignored or underutilised,
while Presidents or others high-ranking executive
branch officials would take the responsibility to solve
controversies themselves.
There are no legitimate institutions or mechanisms in
Mercosur, such as the ECJ in the EU, to play a key role
in upholding the rule of law. According to Malamud,
four main actors are essential in ensuring the successful
integration of the EU: (1) the national states, (2) the
transnational transactors, (3) the European Commission
and (4) the ECJ. The last two of the four components
are absent in the experience of Mercosur, thus making
the member states the main conductors of the process of
integration. Increasing interdependence, in opposition
to the cases of other regional groupings, has not led to
an increase in demand for the general rules in Mercosur.
Rather, the demands of these groupings are aimed at the
promulgation of decisions that are of paramount impor-
65. Presidential Diplomacy is popular among the members of Latin America,
and consequently, with the Mercosur countries. This is reflected in the
fact that the regimes contained therein have often been described as
being ‘asymmetric, unbalanced, hyper-presidential or concentrationist’.
In: A. Malamud, ‘Presidential Diplomacy and the Institutional Underpin-
nings of Mercosur: An Empirical Examination’, 40(1) Latin American
Research Review 138-164 (February 2005). A combination of strong
presidentialism and a weakness in political parties is a commonly occur-
ring feature.
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tance to their operations. In relation to this, the Presi-
dents have then responded to the increase in their tasks
by becoming ‘more accessible, more responsive, more
effective, faster – than any other actors to reach deci-
sions’.66
In fact, legal and institutional transplants from the EU
are not a guarantee of success in deepening the integra-
tion process. Eventually, the laws and institutions, cop-
ied in response to unreflective imitation, are likely either
to be resisted or to remain unused.67 However, through
the implementation of some adjustments, considering
the peculiarities and the reality of Mercosur, the path of
integration in the EU remains an example to be fol-
lowed.
One of the adjustments to be highly considered is the
elimination of the choice of forum in the settlement of
disputes. To date, the Mercosur member states are free
to submit their disputes to other courts, including the
WTO and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The
DSM of Mercosur should have exclusive jurisdiction
over all disputes concerning its legal order. Eventually,
one could question whether the existence of the choice
of forum in Mercosur is really a problem. It is not. At
first, such a change would not avoid the persistence of
Presidential Diplomacy. However, it would create a
positive image and an impression of prestige and credi-
bility around the Dispute Settlement System outside
the bloc. The implementation of a reform would cer-
tainly be a demonstration of faith and trust in the devel-
opment of the Mercosur integration process and would
tackle the lack of political commitment on the part of
the member states.
Mercosur resorted to Presidential Diplomacy in order to
survive the crises it has experienced over the years.
However, the positions taken by the member states
when faced with risks have been turning into castles in
the air, since they do not have the capacity to coordinate
regulatory and macroeconomic policies.
The survival of the regional grouping is also heavily
dependent on the outcome of political struggles in
Argentina and Brazil as well as on the harmonisation of
exchange rate policies between the two countries. To
date, however, several periods of strong instability in all
member states have been damaging and have therefore
hindered any serious attempt to coordinate macroeco-
nomic policies. Notably, the suspensions of Paraguay
and Venezuela from Mercosur are examples of sources
of more instability.68
66. Malamud (2005), above n. 65, at 139.
67. K.J. Alter, et al., ‘Transplanting the European Court of Justice: The
Experience of the Andean Tribunal of Justice’, 60(3) American Journal
of Comparative Law 629-665 (2012).
68. The Presidents of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay decided to suspend
Paraguay’s rights to participate in Mercosur, at a summit held in Men-
doza (Argentina). This suspension was related to the deposition of Para-
guay’s President by the country’s Congress on 21 and 22 June 2012,
and thus it was justified under the Protocol of Ushuaia. Paraguay
argued that its suspension was invalid, since there was no kind of
breakdown of democracy in the process of the impeachment of Presi-
dent Fernando Lugo (the then Vice-President, Federico Franco, took
office in his place). Elections in Paraguay were held in April 2013, and
7 Conclusion
Despite several problems along its path, it is impossible
to deny that one of the main characteristics of the inter-
national political and economic scene during the second
half of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st
has been economic and political integration. The model
of the EU affected the subsequent efforts towards inte-
gration all around the world. While the EU represents
the most advanced process of integration in the world,
in other continents these experiences still remain reluc-
tant as they face economic and political integration.
During the last few years several governments have
chosen the path of growing unilateralism and trade ten-
sions; some institutionalisation processes seem to stag-
nate, while others undergo reformulations, such as that
which occurred with the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), which was renegotiated and
replaced by the United States-Mexico-Canada Agree-
ment (USMCA), as announced on 30 September 2018.
The fact is that institutionalisation processes cannot be
expected to develop in similar and linear ways. Timeta-
bles are hard to follow, and the path of integration
depends on different factors, such as cultural back-
grounds, peculiarities and history intrinsically linked to
the states involved in such a process. Mercosur could be
considered as being one of the main regional organisa-
tions around the globe. Still, the fact that it has existed
for almost thirty years is not necessarily a testament that
the regional bloc has positioned itself well in the inter-
national community. Mercosur is not exempt from the
problems that typically occur to every regional organisa-
tion. Despite some initial years of relative success, there
are still problems and issues from within that could hin-
der the future development of this regional bloc.
Besides, the institutionalisation of Mercosur, with the
creation of several organs during the last decades, seems
to be innocuous, as it apparently has not contributed to
the advancement of the process of integration. The
adoption of intergovernmentalism or supranationalism
is not a sine qua non for the success of an integration
bloc. In Mercosur’s case, necessary conditions for the
deepening of the integration process lie in the intrinsic
characteristics of member states, which have, to date,
prevented major qualitative changes in its institutions.
Taking a broader view, it can be seen that, from the
beginning of the 2000s until 2019, most member states
Horacio Cartes became the new President. In December 2013, the
Chamber of Deputies of Paraguay finally approved the protocol of the
accession of Venezuela into Mercosur, and President Horacio Cartes
manifested the intention of Paraguay of returning to the bloc. The offi-
cial return occurred during the XLVI Summit of Mercosur in Caracas
(Venezuela), in July 2014.Santos (2015, p. 50) affirmed that: ‘the event
that has revealed the aligning of the majority of presidents, acting as a
sort of friends’ club and emphasizing the political dimension above the
legal and that ‘what is relevant in this context is how these integration
processes rely on the political will of the decision-makers even above
institutionalism and, in this specific case, on the perception of peers of
being aligned or not (i.e., like a friends’ club with whom to share com-
mon projects).’ In: S.C. Santos, ‘Identity in Mercosur: Regionalism and
Nationalism’, 21 Global Governance 43-59 (2015).
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have chosen, when necessary, to return to protection-
ism. This position has become commonplace among
Mercosur leaders, since some of them prefer to disre-
gard the regulations of the bloc to fulfil domestic
demands. Lack of coordination of trade policies and
unilateral responses to political-economic shocks thus
seem to persist indefinitely; it seems that the priority of
almost all of the member states is, currently, to deal
with domestic problems. The reality encapsulates con-
cerns over widespread corruption in Brazil,69 Argenti-
na’s endless economic crisis, the scars of the temporary
suspension of Paraguay, Venezuela’s crisis and its sus-
pension from the bloc, and Uruguay’s systematic criti-
cisms of Mercosur. All these factors expose the internal
limits of regional integration in Mercosur, creating a
wave of discouragement and pessimism about its future.
Besides, externally, as a bloc, Mercosur has until only
recently been criticised for the poor results obtained
through the signing of free-trade agreements (FTAs)
with other countries.
However, as Mercosur turns almost thirty years old,
there are expectations of convergence and tolerance
among member states, as proven at least towards the
signature of the FTA with the EU: despite the domestic
problems, Mercosur and the EU concluded, on 28 June
2019, negotiations on the trade agreement between the
blocs.70 Discussions lasted two decades and were indeed
intensified since 2016. The free-trade area will be one of
the largest in the world: 25% of world GDP and a mar-
ket of 780 million people. The agreement, in principle,
covers seventeen areas: 1. Trade in Goods; 2. Rules of
Origin; 3. Customs and Trade Facilitation; 4. Trade
Remedies; 5. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS); 6. Dialogues; 7. Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT); 8. Services and Establishment; 9. Public Pro-
curement; 10. Competition; 11. Subsidies; 12. State-
owned Enterprises; 13. Intellectual Property Rights,
including Geographical Indications; 14. Trade and Sus-
tainable Development; 15. Transparency; 16. Small and
Medium-sized Enterprises; and 17. Dispute Settlement.
It is already considered as Mercosur’s most important
achievement in its external relations, and it strongly
indicates that both blocs stand for a rule-based trade
system. As EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malm-
ström declared, ‘We reinforce multilateral agreements
whilst others rip them up’, referring to Donald Trump’s
administration.71
It is to be seen whether such an agreement will have, as
one of its possible spill over effects, the upgrading of
regulatory, sectorial and macroeconomic coordination
and greater convergence in trade policies among Merco-
69. The former Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, himself, has
been convicted of corruption. He is serving a 12-year jail term. Opera-
tion Car Wash is still in progress, which may be the biggest corruption
scandal in history. See: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
jun/01/brazil-operation-car-wash-is-this-the-biggest-corruption-
scandal-in-history. Retrieved on 8 November 2018.
70. The signatures of other FTAs are expected in the months to come.
71. See: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/03/while-trump-isolates-u-s-
its-lets-make-a-deal-for-the-rest-of-the-world-trade-fta-mercosur-eu/.
Retrieved on 15 July 2019.
sur countries.72 As Marcos Troyjo, Brazil’s deputy min-
ister of the economy, in charge of foreign trade,
affirmed, the Mercosur-EU agreement will ‘give us the
opportunity to press the reset button on Mercosur’.73
72. Before the conclusion of such an agreement, surprisingly, Mercosur had
only signed FTAs with the following: Israel, in December 2007 (in
force); Egypt, in August 2010 (in force); and the State of Palestine, in
December 2011 (not in force).
73. See: https://www.poder360.com.br/economia/acordo-com-uniao-euro
peia-permite-reset-no-mercosul-diz-marcos-troyjo. Retrieved on 15 July
2019.
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Annex I
Partial Scope Agreement of Economic Complementarity
(PS.ECA) Currently in Force
No 2 Brazil Uruguay
No 6 Argentina Mexico
No 13 Argentina Paraguay
No 14 Argentina Brazil
No 16 Argentina Chile
No 18 Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay
No 22 Bolivia Chile
No 23 Chile Venezuela
No 24 Chile Colombia
No 33 Colombia Mexico Venezuela
No 35 Argentina Brazil Chile Paraguay Uruguay
No 36 Argentina Bolivia Brazil Paraguay Uruguay
No 38 Chile Peru
No 40 Cuba Venezuela
No 41 Chile Mexico
No 42 Chile Cuba
No 46 Cuba Ecuador
No 47 Bolivia Cuba
No 49 Colombia Cuba
No 50 Cuba Peru
No 51 Cuba Mexico
No 53 Brazil Mexico
No 54 Argentina Brazil Mexico Paraguay Uruguay
No 55 Argentina Brazil Mexico Paraguay Uruguay
No 57 Argentina Uruguay
No 58 Argentina Brazil Paraguay Peru Uruguay
No 59 Argentina Brazil Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Uruguay Venezuela
No 60 Mexico Uruguay
No 62 Argentina Brazil Cuba Paraguay Uruguay
No 63 Uruguay Venezuela
No 64 Paraguay Venezuela
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No 65 Chile Ecuador
No 66 Bolivia Mexico
No 67 Mexico Peru
No 68 Argentina Venezuela
No 69 Brazil Venezuela
No 70 Bolivia Cuba Venezuela Nicaragua
No 71 Cuba Panama
No 72 Argentina Brazil Colombia Paraguay Uruguay
No 73 Chile Uruguay
Source: http://Mercosur.aladi.org/nsfaladi/textacdos.nsf/vacewebp. Retrieved on 27 June 2019.
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Annex II
Institutional Landmarks – Mercosur’s History of Integra-
tion
Date Agreement Title
28 June 2019 Mercosur – EU Signing of the Free Trade Agreement between Mercosur and the European
Union.
17 June 2018 Mercosur Signing of the Framework Agreement between Mercosur and the Financial
Fund for the Development of the Plata Basin (FONPLATA).
20 July 2017 Mercosur Signing of the Memorandum of Understanding for the exchange of docu-
ments to clarify serious human rights violations.
01 December 2016 Mercosur Suspension of Venezuela.
17 July 2015 Mercosur Signature of a new Bolivia’s Protocol of Accession to Mercosur. Paraguay was
suspended from the bloc during the signature of the previous protocol.
Although it was suspended, Paraguay was still a full member of the group,
and according to Art. 20 of the Treaty of Asunción, it should also approve the
admission of a new partner. The procedure of ratification is not necessary in
Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela, whose parliaments have already ratified
the first protocol.
16 July 2015 Mercosur New exceptions to the Common External Tariff (CET).
18 December 2013 Mercosur Paraguay approved the admission of Venezuela to Mercosur.
05 April 2013 Mercosur Venezuela adopted Mercosur Common Nomenclature (MCN).
26 December 2012 Mercosur Liberalisation of intra-regional trade with Venezuela.
07 December 2012 Mercosur Signature of Bolivia’s Protocol of Accession to Mercosur.
21 November 2012 Mercosur Argentina approved the Mercosur Customs Code (MCC).
30 July 2012 Mercosur Venezuela’s Mercosur incorporation.
29 June 2012 Mercosur Restructuring of the Common Market Group (CMG).
29 June 2012 Mercosur New exceptions to the Common External Tariff (CET).
29 June 2012 Mercosur Suspension of Paraguay.
20 December 2011 Mercosur Mercosur CMC Decision 38/11 created an ad hoc working group to enable
the Republic of Ecuador to be fully incorporated into the bloc.
20 December 2011 Mercosur Signature of the Protocol of Montevideo on Commitment to Democracy in
Mercosur (Ushuaia II). It established the participation of Brazil, Argentina, Par-
aguay, Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.
20 December 2011 Mercosur Mercosur adopted a mechanism to generate new exceptions to the Common
External Tariff (CET).
28 September 2011 Mercosur Approval of LAIA – Mercosur provisions relating to rules of origin and special
import duties.
16 December 2010 Mercosur Identification of priority issues and creation of the institutional mechanism
called ‘High General Representative of Mercosur’.
16 December 2010 Mercosur Specifications for the use of temporary exceptions to the CET and advance-
ment in the consolidation programme of the Customs Union.
16 December 2010 Mercosur Mercosur developed regulations concerning the social dimension of integra-
tion.
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Date Agreement Title
02 August 2010 Mercosur Mercosur decisions oriented towards the improvement of the Customs Union.
07 December 2009 Mercosur CMC extended the use of drawback and of temporary admission in intra-
regional trade.
07 December 2009 Mercosur CMC defined and extended exceptions to the CET.
24 July 2009 Mercosur Unification of rules of origin.
24 July 2009 Mercosur New details in the utilisation of local currencies in intra-Mercosur trade trans-
actions.
15 December 2008 Mercosur Postponed definitions regarding the common external trade policy.
30 June 2008 Mercosur Mercosur attempted to strengthen its productive complementarity.
18 January 2007 Mercosur The first pilot projects to be financed by the Structural Convergence Fund
were approved.
04 July 2006 Mercosur The accession to the integration scheme by the Bolivarian Republic of Vene-
zuela was signed by its President and Presidents of the four member states of
Mercosur.
09 December 2005 Mercosur Signature of the Constitutive Protocol of the Parliament of the Mercosur: crea-
tion of the Mercosur Parliament.
02 January 2004 Mercosur The Olivos Protocol (PO) finally entered into force. Prior to 1 January 2004,
the applicable instruments were Annex III of the Treaty of Asunción and the
Protocol of Brasília.
06 October 2003 Mercosur Creation of the Committee of Permanent Representatives of Mercosur, as a
standing body to assist the CMC and the Pro Tempore President.
18 June 2003 Mercosur XXIV Meeting of the CMC, when two proposals were presented: creation of
an Institute for Monetary Co-operation in Mercosur and the conclusion of a
‘Programme for the Consolidation of the Customs Union and the launch of
the Common Market’.
06 December 2002 Mercosur XXIII Meeting of the CMC, for the discussion of the internalisation of norms
from Mercosur, regulation of the dispute settlement system and the gradual
transformation of the administrative secretariat into a technical one.
11 November 2002 Argentina – Brazil –
PS.ECA 14
The 31st Additional Protocol, internalised by both countries, incorporated the
Treaty of bilateral integration formalised in LAIA as PS.ECA 14, as a new
‘Agreement on Common Automotive Policy between the Republic of Argenti-
na and the Federative Republic of Brazil’.
18 February 2002 Mercosur Institutional strengthening: III Extraordinary Meeting of the CMC: Presidents
signed the Protocol of Olivos, which, once ratified (1 January 2004), replaced
the Brasília Protocol for the Settlement of Disputes. The Protocol of Olivos
provided different mechanisms to settle disputes between member states
related to the interpretation, application and breach of the Treaty of Asunción
and subsequent treaties, decisions or measures taken under the Treaty of
Asunción. The mechanisms are a) direct negotiations (Chapter IV), b) an
optional mediation procedure before the Mercosur Group (Chapter V), c) ad
hoc arbitration (Chapter VI) and d) proceedings before the Permanent Review
Court (Chapter VII). Letters ‘a’ and ‘b’ are known as pre-trial mechanisms. The
Protocol of Olivos provided the aforementioned Permanent Review Tribunal,
which was officially installed more than two years later (in August 2004), and
its role was to settle disputes submitted to it by member states and to give
advisory opinions on legal questions that might arise. Besides, the Protocol of
Olivos also established the recognition of the possibility that the applicant
member state can choose and submit the dispute to the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) or to other mechanisms
provided by preferential trading schemes of which they are parties.
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Date Agreement Title
20 December 2001 Mercosur Revision of some of the deadlines initially set for the ‘Relaunching of Merco-
sur’.
07 April 2001 Mercosur Through Decision 1/01, the CMC authorised Argentina to apply exceptional
and temporary (until 31 December 2002) import duties of products originating
from non-member countries.
14 December 2000 Mercosur CMC extended the deadlines for various decisions made during the previous
meeting and set a new regime of exceptions to the CET.
29 June 2000 Mercosur ‘Relaunching of Mercosur’: CMC issued several decisions aiming to schedule
the removal of restrictive measures and domestic regulations that caused dis-
tortionary effects on intra-regional trade.
08 December 1998 Mercosur Through Resolution 77/98, the CMG established the mutual recognition and
equivalence of control systems.
24 July 1998 Mercosur Signature of Protocol of Ushuaia on Democratic Commitment in Mercosur,
the Republic of Bolivia and the Republic of Chile.
16 April 1998 Mercosur Framework Agreement for the creation of a free-trade area Mercosur –
Andean Community (CAN): The Framework Agreement could not lead imme-
diately to the negotiation stipulated therein. Consequently, Brazil, on the one
hand, and Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, on the other, agreed by
the 39th Economic Complementation Agreement (ECA) of LAIA, to establish
fixed preference margins as a first step towards the creation of a free-trade
area between the Andean Community and Mercosur. On 31 March 2000 a
second negotiation was concluded, this time between the countries of the
Andean Community and Argentina, with the purpose of signing another LAIA
agreement. Concerning Bolivia, the 36th ECA of LAIA of 17 December 1996
set a programme to implement a free-trade area between this country and
Mercosur.
25 June 1996 Mercosur Economic Complementation Agreement Mercosur-Chile: (on 1 October 1996)
came into force. This agreement constituted the first free-trade area between
Mercosur and a third country.
15 December 1995 Mercosur Mercosur-EU: Signing of the Interregional Framework Co-operation Agree-
ment between the European Community and its Member States, on the one
hand, and the Southern Common Market and its Party States, on the other –
Joint Declaration on political dialogue between the European Union and Mer-
cosur. The treaty institutionalised political dialogue at the level of heads of
state and set a commitment to address the preparatory work for the establish-
ment of a future free-trade area between the two regions.
05 August 1995 Mercosur ‘Mercosur Action Program Until the Year 2000’: through Decision 9/95, the
CMC defined the intent of deepening the integration process and proceeded
towards the creation of a common market. Final and intermediate goals were
raised: consolidation of the free-trade area and of the conditions of intra-
regional competition; improvement of the common trade policy; legal and
institutional development; services; communications; transport and infrastruc-
ture; tourism; financial affairs; tax issues; macroeconomic policies; Mercosur
external relations; and global dimension of integration (environment, culture,
health, education, science and technology, intellectual property, police coop-
eration and migration).
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Date Agreement Title
17 December 1994 Mercosur Protocol of Ouro Preto (Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asunción): it
adapted the original structure of Mercosur in order to consolidate the customs
union, with the aim of moving towards the Common Market. It also defined a
scheme of final adjustment to the customs union with the extension of the
transitional period, until 1 January 1999 for Argentina and Brazil, and until
1 January 2000 for Paraguay and Uruguay. The Protocol of Ouro Preto also
raised the structure of Mercosur, with the creation of new organs: a) the Mer-
cosur Trade Commission (MTC, issuing directives), subject to the CMG and
responsible for ensuring the application of common trade policy instruments
agreed by the member states for the functioning of the customs union; b) the
Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC); and c) the Economic-Social Consultative
Forum (ESCF). The protocol also augmented the powers of the Administrative
Secretariat of Mercosur (ASM). It entered into force on 15 December 1995.
09 December 1994 Mercosur Through Decision 22/94 at the VII Meeting of the CMC, the customs union
entered into force: the CET began with eleven different levels of aliquots
(from 0% to 20%); it defined a period of convergence on sectors such as cap-
ital goods, telecommunication equipment and computing machinery; submis-
sion of lists of exceptions to the CET was allowed; temporary exceptions were
allowed for each member state; definition of special regimes for sugar, auto-
motive and textile products; approval of a rule of mutual tolerance to a tariff
increase of three points, initially until 31 December 2000.
14 October 1994 Mercosur Extension of interregional trade restrictions.
01 July 1993 Mercosur Integrated Border Management.
17 December 1991 Mercosur The Protocol of Brasília for the Settlement of Disputes was signed in compli-
ance with Art. 3 and Annex III of the Treaty of Asunción. It adopted a settle-
ment of disputes system for the period of transition, and it was provided that
the system would end in December 1994. A General Proceeding for Claims
before the Mercosur Trade Commission was later annexed to the Protocol of
Ouro Preto, in 1994.
29 November 1991 Mercosur Economic Complementation Agreement (ECA) number 18: To comply with
the most-favoured-nation of the Treaty of Montevideo (1980), member states
signed the ECA 18 in which they transcribed the commitments made at the
Treaty of Asunción and protocolised it in the LAIA.
26 March 1991 Mercosur – ECA 18 Signature of the Treaty of Asunción, establishing the Common Market of the
South between the Republics of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
20 December 1990 Argentina – Brazil ECA
14*
Argentina and Brazil signed the Economic Complementation Agreement (ECA)
14 under the auspices of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). It
formalised the goals set by the Buenos Aires Act of 6 July 1990. This agree-
ment consolidated all previous bilateral trade agreements into a single text,
such as the economic complementation agreements numbers 7 (capital) and
12 (food industry) and agreements in areas such as nuclear cooperation and
the automotive industry. The ECA 14 defined the process of trade liberalisa-
tion to continue until 31 December 1994, especially concerning the progres-
sive tariff reduction (linear and automatic reductions), the decrease of the lists
of exceptions and the elimination of non-tariff barriers.
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06 July 1990 Argentina – Brazil Deepening of the Integration Process between Argentina and Brazil: Presi-
dents signed the Buenos Aires Act, in order to anticipate deadlines of the Inte-
gration Treaty of 1988. They decided to establish a common market between
the two countries, ‘which must be definitively shaped by December 31, 1994’.
06 July 1990 Argentina – Brazil Signature of the Treaty for the Establishment of the Statute for Bi-national
Companies Brazil-Argentina: it granted national treatment to companies
located in the territory of any of the two countries subject to some require-
ments. The instruments of ratification were exchanged on the occasion of the
meeting of the CMC on 26 and 27 June 1992 in Las Lenas, Argentina.
29 November 1988 Argentina – Brazil Treaty of Integration, Co-operation and Development between Argentina and
Brazil: to definitively consolidate the process of integration between the two
countries. The Treaty defines, as an ultimate goal, the creation of a common
market. As a preparatory stage, the objectives were to remove tariff barriers
within a maximum term of ten years and to achieve macroeconomic policy
harmonisation.
29 July 1986 Argentina – Brazil Signature of the Minutes for the Brazilian-Argentinean Economic Integration
and Co-operation (Programa de Integración Mercosur Cooperación Económi-
ca – PICE). This, then, saw the beginning of the integration and economic
cooperation process between the Federate Republic of Brazil and the Republic
of Argentina, which was based on the principles of gradualism, equilibrium
and symmetry in order to allow for a progressive adaptation of the inhabitants
and the companies in each member state to the new competition and eco-
nomic legislation conditions.
* The Treaty of Montevideo II (1980) makes the distinction between ‘Regional scope agreement’ and ‘Partial scope agreement’. Article 6 of
the Treaty establishes that ‘Regional scope agreements are those in which all member countries participate. They shall be drawn up within the
framework of the objectives and provisions of the present Treaty, and may refer to the same matters and include those instruments foreseen
for the partial scope agreements provided for in the third section of the present chapter’, while Article 7 establishes that ‘Partial scope agree-
ments are those wherein all member countries do not participate. These agreements shall tend to create the conditions necessary to deepen
the regional integration process by means of their progressive multilateralization. Rights and obligations to be established in partial scope
agreements shall exclusively bind the signatory member countries or those adhered thereto’.
Source: http://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/LAIA-ALADI.pdf.
Elaborated by the present author.
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Annex III
Main Provisions of Treaties
Treaty of Asunción (1991) Signed by the four founding members: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uru-
guay. This serves as the legal document that forms the basis of the establish-
ment of Mercosur.
Brasília Protocol on Dispute Settlement (1991) The Brasília Protocol on Dispute Settlement introduced an arbitration mecha-
nism for dispute settlement, which became the first regional integration
scheme in the Latin American continent.
Ouro Preto Protocol (1994) The Ouro Preto Protocol is considered to be the present constitution of Mer-
cosur. It recognises the legal existence of the bloc under international law.
Aside from this, it also lays out most of the current make-up of Mercosur and
gives it authority to negotiate agreements with third parties.
Olivos Protocol on Dispute Settlement (2002) The Olivos Protocol on Dispute Settlement builds on previous protocols. It was
responsible for the creation of the Permanent Review Tribunal (TPR) as well as
a post-decision control mechanism for Mercosur.
Creation of Funds for the Structural Convergence
of Mercosur (FOCEM) (2005)
The main objectives of FOCEM are: a) financing programmes to promote
structural convergence; b) increasing competitiveness and promoting social
cohesion in less developed countries and regions; c) supporting the function-
ing of the institutional framework; d) and strengthening the integration pro-
cess.
Elaborated by the present author.
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